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FORGOTTEN NAMESAKE:
THE ILLINOIS GOOD SAMARITAN ACT'S
INEXCUSABLE FAILURE TO PROVIDE
IMMUNITY TO NON-MEDICAL RESCUERS
DAVID WELDON*

I.

PUNISHMENT FOR A GOOD DEED

Danger invites rescue. The cry of distress is the summons to
relief.
- Justice Cardozo1

On Halloween night in 2004, the lives of co-workers Lisa Torti
and Alexandra Van Horn tragically changed forever. The two
young women departed a California bar with three friends in
separate cars; Van Horn rode in the first, and Torti followed in the
second.2 On the ride home, the driver of Van Horn's vehicle lost
control and crashed violently into a light post at forty-five miles
per hour.3
Having witnessed the frightening accident, the driver of the
second car quickly pulled over to assist the occupants in the first
car. 4 Torti saw smoke and liquid coming from the car and feared
that it might explode at any moment, so she ran over and pulled
her friend Van Horn from the wreckage.5 A short while later,
emergency medical personnel arrived on the scene and transported
6
Van Horn and the other injured passenger to a nearby hospital.
While to most, this is a story of a courageous woman who
sought to save her injured friend and co-worker from risk of
further injury, Alexandra Van Horn viewed the situation in a very
different light. Van Horn sued Torti for negligence, alleging that
she was not in need of assistance.' Van Horn believed that by
pulling her from the car like a "rag doll," her co-worker severely

* Juris Doctor Candidate, May 2011. I would like to thank my beautiful
wife Lauren for her contributions, edits, and encouragement. I would also like
to thank my parents for their unwavering support in every task I take on.
1. Wagner v. Int'l Ry. Co., 133 N.E. 437, 437 (N.Y. 1921).
2. Van Horn v. Watson, 197 P.3d 164, 166 (Cal. 2008).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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aggravated an injury she sustained to her vertebrae in the crash.8
The trial court initially held Torti immune from suit under the
California Good Samaritan law.9 The California Supreme Court
ultimately reversed, holding that the Good Samaritan immunity
applied only to persons rendering emergency medical care.10
Under this narrow interpretation of the law, Torti's act did not
constitute emergency medical care because she was not a medical
professional." As a result, she received no immunity for any
ordinary negligence in her actions.12
Part II of this Comment will discuss reactions to the
California Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the law, and
how the public backlash ultimately led to change. This section will
also discuss the conflict between morality and the common law noduty rule. This section will next provide a brief history of Good
Samaritan statutes in the United States and the policy reasons
behind their enactment. Part III of this Comment will compare
and contrast the coverage of Illinois's Good Samaritan Act with
California's recently amended Good Samaritan law and will briefly
recognize noteworthy approaches taken in other states. Part IV
proposes that Illinois follow California's lead and provide
immunity protection for ordinary citizens13 who courageously come
to the aid of their fellow citizens. Finally, this Comment urges the
Illinois General Assembly to provide some type of restorative
compensation to Good Samaritans who are injured or killed when
performing their heroic acts.

8. Id. As a result of the crash's violent impact Van Horn is now
permanently paralyzed. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. In his dissent, Justice Baxter argued vigorously that a statute's
plain meaning should prevail. Id. at 172 (Baxter, J., dissenting). In his
opinion, the majority had simply inserted the word "medical" into the statute
where it previously did not exist, thereby distorting the plain meaning of the
statute:
There is no reason why one kind of lay volunteer aid should be immune,
while another is not. Yet the majority imposes an arbitrary and
unreasonable limitation on the protection this statute affords to Good
Samaritans. The majority rewrites [the Good Samaritan statute] to
insert the word "medical" at two crucial points where it does not appearonce before the word "care" and again before the word "emergency."
Thus, the majority concludes, the statute affords immunity only for
emergency medical care rendered by an uncompensated layperson at the
scene of a medical emergency.
Id. (emphasis in original).
11. Id. at 166.
12. Id.
13. This Comment uses the term "ordinary citizen" to refer to people
without any type of medical training, certification, or other expertise. The
term "citizen" will also be used to refer to this group of non-medical people.
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

Public Backlash Leads to Change

Not surprisingly, the outcome in Van Horn v.

Watson

outraged people across the country and received national press
coverage.1 4 People were shocked to learn that a person could be
forced to defend a lawsuit after heroically trying to aid a friend in
need.' 5 Meanwhile, lawyers and other legal professionals debated
the California Supreme Court's narrow reading of the Good
Samaritan Law.' 6
14. See, e.g., Alison Stateman, The Perils of Being a Good Samaritan in
California,TIME, Jan. 14, 2009, available at http://www.time.com/timelnation/
article/0,8599,1871331,00.html (noting that under the court's ruling "one good
deed may very well not go unpunished"). The article also provides insight into
the possible repercussions of the ruling through a quote from Torti's lawyer,
"Here in California, one of these days we can have another earthquake, and
the question is, Do you want people to help or do you want people to be
thinking about whether they're going to get sued?" Id.; see also Editorial, 171
Have to Call My Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/03/opinion/03sat2.html? r=3&scp=l&sq=goo
d%samaratian%20california%20&st-cse (describing the implications of the
case as "disturbing" because the law should not deter people from seeking to
provide any help they can when witnessing an accident). The editorial
concludes by encouraging other states to examine their own Good Samaritan
laws to make sure they do not discourage "well-meaning bystanders from
aiding people in harm's way." Id. This Comment seeks to do precisely that for
the state of Illinois.
15. Posting of Rod Brouhard to About.com First Aid Blog, Goodbye Good
Samaritans,http://firstaid.about.com/b/2008/12/19/goodbye-good-samaritans.h
tm (Dec. 19, 2008). Brouhard began his posting in a very direct manner by
stating, "The California Supreme Court blew it big this time." Id. He goes on
to express his disappointment in the court's failure to come to Torti's rescue,
as she bravely did for her friend. Id. Instead, he was left "appalled by what
should be a no-brainer to the courts." Id. As for the injury in dispute,
Brouhard asserts that there is "very little evidence that moving a victim of
spinal injury actually results in some sort of catastrophic secondary injury like
this lawsuit suggests." Id. Brouhard has been a paramedic since 1988 and a
volunteer firefighter since 1987 and is certified in emergency medical
dispatch, advanced cardiac life support, international trauma life support,
pediatric advanced life support, and CPR. Bio of Rod Brouhard,
http://firstaid.about.com/bio/Rod-Brouhard-18964.htm (last visited Dec. 3,
2010).
16. Posting of Anthony J. Sebok to Findlaw's Writ, The CaliforniaSupreme
Court Holds that Good Samaritans Providing Nonmedical Aid Can be Held
Liable if They Act Negligently, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20090113.h
tml (Jan. 13, 2009). Sebok, a law professor at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of
Law in New York City, notes that the case produced a great deal of negative
legal commentary. Id. Nevertheless, he defends the court's decision because he
believes that only people with medical training should be granted statutory
immunity. Id. In doing so, Sebok makes sure to point out that the plaintiff and
defendant in the case had previously been at a bar and at the time of the
accident may have been "high or drunk." Id. Sebok uses this fact to question
whether or not society should "prudentially" seek to encourage untrained
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As a result of this public outcry, the California Legislature
moved quickly to change the law and prevent similar cases from
recurring.17 In August 2009, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
signed the amended statute into law, providing protection for all
citizens who come to the aid of another in an emergency.18 Thus
far, the public's response to the amended law has been positive.19
B.

Morality Versus the Common Law No-Duty Rule

The term "Good Samaritan" traces its roots to the New
Testament of the Bible. 20 The famous parable tells the story of a
man who was beaten, robbed, and left injured by the side of the
road. 21 A Levite and a priest passed him by and offered no
assistance, but a Samaritan stopped, dressed his wounds, and took
him to a nearby inn. 22 Once there, the Good Samaritan promised
to pay for the injured man's lodging and care without expecting
anything in return. 23
Although this parable teaches that we are morally obligated
to come to the aid of a fellow person, American law has
people in such a state to intervene in an emergency situation. Id. Notably,
Sebok readily admits that the events leading up to the accident should be
ignored given the posture of the appeal. Id. He also fears that in many
emergency situations "amateurs," such as the defendant Torti, without
medical training may be "out of their league." Id.
17. Posting of Kim Stone to California Civil Justice Blog, California
Supreme Court Good Samaritan Case Leads to Three Bills http://www.cjac.org/
blog/2009/01/california-supreme-court-good.php (Jan. 14, 2009) [hereinafter
Stone]. One such legislator was Republican John Benoit, who spent thirty-one
years in law enforcement prior to joining the California state legislature.
Stateman, supra note 14. Benoit said that during his time as a highway patrol
officer he responded to countless accident scenes and frequently arrived to find
citizens already helping the victims. Id. After hearing about the case, Benoit
said he was "extremely concerned that it would in any way thwart people's
willingness to give that aid, because in my experience that would translate
into lives lost." Id.
18. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1799.102 (West 2009); Amanda
Bronstad, Gov Schwarzenegger Signs Tort Reforms Into Law, THE NATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL, Aug. 18, 2009, available at http://law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120
2433125785.
The law protects people not in the medical profession who help someone
at the scene of an accident unless their actions constitute gross negligence or
recklessness. Id. The bill was passed with the unanimous approval of every
member of the large California legislature. Bob Egelko, Good Samaritansget
protection from lawsuits, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 8, 2009, at C3.
19. See, e.g., Karen Moret, Letter to the Editor, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Aug. 17, 2009, at 9A (writing to applaud the Governor for signing the new
bill); Mike McDowd, Letter to the Editor, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 23, 2009, at Eli
(praising the Governor for providing protection to non-medical rescuers).
20. Luke 10:30-35.
2 1. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
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consistently refused to recognize such a moral duty. 24 Courts have
even used the parable as an example when discussing the common
law's no-duty rule. 25 As one commentator noted, "although the
duty to assist an injured or endangered person is commonplace
throughout the world, our law continues to rely solely on man's
unselfish spirit."26
The lack of duty is partly due to the historical differentiation
between liability for negligence based on misfeasance, active
conduct which causes harm to another, and nonfeasance, passive
inaction or a failure to take steps that could otherwise prevent
harm.27 In the case of nonfeasance, the party in need of aid is
arguably no worse off by the potential rescuer's failure to act. 28
Rather, he has been left in precisely the same condition he would
have been in had the rescuer never appeared. 29 The only true
"loss" to the injured party is that he failed to obtain a benefit in
the form of aid. 30 It is this sometimes subtle distinction and the
common law's unwavering belief that individuals are capable of
protecting themselves which has historically supported the no-

24. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 856 at 340 (4th
ed. 1971); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 56 at 373 (5th ed. 1984). One of the most famous stories exemplifying
the lack of duty is the case of Kitty Genovese, who was stalked and brutally
stabbed to death in the street in 1964 while thirty neighbors allegedly all
looked on in terror, yet refused to call the police for fear of getting involved.
Joe Sexton, Reviving Kitty Genovese Case, and Its Passions,N.Y. TIMES, July
25, 1995, at Bl.
25. Buch v. Armory Mfr. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1898). There, the court
stated, "For example, the priest and Levite who passed by on the other side
were not, it is supposed, liable at law for the continued suffering of the man
who fell among thieves, which they might, and morally ought to have,
prevented or relieved." Id.
26. Jay Silver, The Duty To Rescue: A Reexamination and Proposal,26 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 423, 424 (1985). Portugal was the first European country to
adopt such a law in 1867. Id. at 434-35. The Netherlands, Finland, and Italy
all enacted similar legislation in the nineteenth century, and most of the other
countries of continental Europe did so in the early to mid-twentieth century.
Id. The French law became a hot topic of discussion after the untimely death
of Princess Diana in Paris. See, e.g., Charles Trueheart, Diana's Guard Can't
Recall Paris Crash; French Investigation Secretive, Methodical, WASH. POST,
Sept. 20, 1997, at Al (discussing the country's investigation of a motorcycle
rider and nine photographers for failing to rescue the Princess and other
injured victims of the accident).
27. PROSSER, supra note 24 at 338. Commentators frequently give extreme
examples to demonstrate nonfeasance. An expert swimmer, with a boat and a
rope at hand, who sees another drowning before his eyes, is not required to do
anything at all about it, but may sit on the dock, smoke his cigarette, and
watch the man drown. Id.
28. Francis H. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort
Liability,56 U. PA. L. REV. 217, 220 (1908).
29. Id.
30. Id.
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duty rule.3 1
The Restatement of Torts is in agreement with the lack of a
general duty to aid. 32 It provides: "The fact that the actor realizes
or should realize that action on his part is necessary for another's
aid or protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take
such action."33 Although this lack of legal duty typically receives
the most attention in dramatic life-or-death rescue situations, the
same principle applies with equal force in situations involving
minimal risk or danger. 34 Similarly, the no-duty rule is not
affected by whether the perilous situation is already in progress
when the potential rescuer first becomes aware of it, or has yet to
occur.35 Displeased with the harshness of the common law rule,
31. Id. at 221.
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965). The Restatement does
recognize four commonly adopted exceptions to the general no-duty principle:
(1) the potential rescuer has a special relationship with the victim; (2) the
potential rescuer has caused the dangerous situation; (3) the rescuer has
begun to help the victim and abandons the effort, leaving the victim in a worse
situation than before intervening; and (4) where a person interferes with or
prevents a rescue by others. Id. §§ 314A, 322-24, 326-27.
33. Id. § 314. Professor Epstein argues that this lack of a duty makes
perfect sense based on the lack of causation. Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, in PERSPECTIVES ON TORT LAW 275, 295 (Robert L. Rabin ed.,
4th ed. Little, Brown and Co. 1995). He uses the example of A drowning while
B is nearby and could come to his assistance without an injury or danger to
himself. Id. at 294. B chooses not to act and A ultimately drowns. Id. Of
course, under the common law position there is no cause of action against B
because he had no duty to act under the circumstances. Id. Epstein points out
that no matter how the facts of cases such as these are twisted, there is no
argument that B caused A any harm. Id. at 295. When viewed in this light,
ignoring the moral issues lurking in the background, the lack of a duty to
assist is understandable. Id. But see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to
Rescue, 90 YALE L. J. 247, 250 (1980) (criticizing Epstein's focus on causation
and arguing in favor of imposing a duty to rescue).
An interesting question arises in the context of professionals and
whether they should have an obligation to come to the aid of someone who is
need of their services. The American Medical Association's code of ethics states
that despite the lack of a tort duty, doctors should nevertheless render services
to the best of their ability when faced with such a situation. VICTOR E.
SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY, AND DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND
SCHWARTZ'S TORTS 419 n.4 (Foundation Press New York 11th ed. 2005).
Common carriers, innkeepers, and public utilities generally are liable for
failure to render service due to their engagement in "public callings," which is
equated with undertaking an obligation to serve the public. Id.; see, e.g., Nevin
v. Pullman Palace-Car Co., 106 1. 222 (1883) (holding the defendant train
company liable for failing to provide a passenger with a spot in a sleeper car as
previously promised and paid for, resulting in great humiliation and
exhaustion to the plaintiff).
34. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (1965).
35. Id. Some noteworthy commentators in favor of the no-duty rule have
expressed a fear that imposing a duty to rescue would lead to the perverse
outcome of people intentionally seeking to avoid dangerous situations and
settings out of concern that they may be faced with substantial liabilities for
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five states have enacted criminal statutes imposing a duty to
36
assist or contact the authorities under certain circumstances.

C. Potential Liabilityfor Rescuers
While providing no general duty to aid, the Restatement of
Torts also allows a person who voluntarily comes to the rescue of
another to be held liable for any negligence in doing so:
One who, being under no duty to do so, takes charge of another who
is helpless adequately to aid or protect himself is subject to liability
to the other for any bodily harm caused to him by (a) the failure of
the actor to exercise reasonable care to secure the safety of the other
while within the actor's charge, or (b) the actor's discontinuing his
aid or protection, if by so doing he leaves the other in a worse
37
position than when the actor took charge of him.
Thus, the rule actually creates an incentive for people not to
come to the aid of someone in need because absent a rescue
38
attempt there is no risk of liability. As Professor William Prosser

failure to meet the obligations placed on them. WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 143-145
(1987).
36. Damien Schiff, Samaritans: Good, Bad and Ugly: A Comparative Law
Analysis, 11 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 77, 92-94 (2005). The states are
Hawaii, Minnesota, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. Id. The
punishments imposed for violation are typically minimal. E.g., WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 940.34 (West 2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 663-1.6 (LexisNexis 2002);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 11-56-1 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. Tit. 12, § 519 (2002); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2000). While prosecutions under these statutes
seem to be relatively rare, cases in some of the states can be found. See, e.g.,
State v. La Plante, 521 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding a
conviction under the Wisconsin duty to aid statute where the defendant was
aware of one person's intentions to assault another, and failed to warn or
assist the potential victim, or call the police after the assault occurred).
An argument can be made that imposing a duty to act fails to remedy
the underlying moral issue because action will then be taken only
involuntarily. See Epstein, supra note 33, at 298 (stating that "no act can be
moral unless it is performed free from external compulsion."). As noted,
several European countries also have criminal laws imposing a duty to rescue.
SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 33, at 419 n.5.
Confusingly, the term "Good Samaritan statute" is rarely used to refer
to a single type of law. For example, it is sometimes used to refer strictly to
laws such as these that impose a duty on people. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY POCKET EDITION 279 (1st ed. 1996) (defining Good Samaritan
statutes as "A law that requires a person to come to the aid of another who is
exposed to grave physical harm, if there is no danger of risk of injury to the
rescuer."). This Comment uses the term "Good Samaritan statute" to refer to
laws which seek to protect those who come to the aid of another by providing
some form of immunity to the rescuer.
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 324 (1965).
38. Buch, 44 A. at 810. The nineteenth century New Hampshire Supreme

Court case is often cited for its straightforward explanation of the no-duty rule
and countervailing moral considerations. The court said:
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succinctly described using the original parable as an example, "the
Good Samaritan who tries to help may find himself mulcted in
damages, while the priest and the Levite who pass by on the other
side go on their cheerful way rejoicing."3 9
D. Enactment of Good SamaritanStatutes
Given the lack of a duty to aid in conjunction with potential
liability for those who seek to provide aid in good faith, many
states enacted statutes to protect rescuers. 40 California passed the
first Good Samaritan statute in 1959,41 and every state has since
followed suit and enacted a Good Samaritan statute of some
type. 42
Importantly, not all Good Samaritan statutes are the same. 43
Some states have statutes that provide broad protection to all
rescuers, while others only provide narrow protection to specific
types of rescuers, such as those that have some type of medical

With purely moral obligations the law does not deal . . . Suppose A.,
standing close by a railroad, sees a two year old babe on the track, and a
car approaching. He can easily rescue the child, with entire safety to
himself, and the instincts of humanity require him to do so. If he does
not, he may, perhaps, justly be styled a ruthless savage and a moral
monster; but he is not liable in damages for the child's injury, or
indictable under the statute for its death.

Id.
39. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at 378.
40. See, e.g., Beasley v. MacDonald Eng'g Co., 249 So. 2d 844, 847 (Ala.
1971) (stating "[ilt was in recognition of this commonlaw [sic] theory of
liability-i.e., that one who volunteers to act though under no duty to do so, is
thereafter charged with the duty of acting carefully-that legislatures have
passed the so-called Good Samaritan statutes abrogating the common law in
certain circumstances."); Jackson v. Mercy Health Ctr., Inc., 864 P.2d 839, 843
(Okla. 1993) (noting that "Oklahoma adopted the Good Samaritan Act ... [to
abrogate] the common-law rescue doctrine for medical providers in an effort to
encourage them to risk helping strangers in need of succor, even when they
have no duty to render aid.").
41. See Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Construction and Application of
"Good Samaritan"Statutes, 68 A.L.R. 4th 294 (1989) (analyzing state and
federal case law construing "Good Samaritan" statutes). This fact is somewhat
ironic when viewed in conjunction with the California Supreme Court's narrow
interpretation of their ground-breaking law in Van Horn. 197 P.3d at 166.
Prior to the decision in that case, many people may have very well thought of
California as the progressive pioneer in this area, which in part may explain
the significant backlash that resulted shortly after the court's ruling was made
public.
42. Melody J. Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to
Assist: Observationof Expanding Criminal Omission Liability, 25 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 385, 388 n.9 (1998); I'll Have to Call My Lawyer, supra note 14.
43. See generally Veilleux, supra note 41 (comparing and contrasting the
scope of various statutes in terms of the categories of people they protect as
well as the range of situations they cover).
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training or certification.44 In the latter situation, many
jurisdictions have enacted several statutes, and each grants
immunity to a particular category of people. 45 Similarly, some
statutes cover only emergencies or accidents, while others apply
more generally to all situations. 46 In sum, Good Samaritan
statutes come in a wide variety of shapes and sizes. This Comment
focuses specifically on the Good Samaritan statutes in Illinois and
California.
E. Rationales behind Good SamaritanStatutes

The purpose of Good Samaritan statutes is to encourage
people to aid others in need by granting statutory immunity from
civil damages and removing the fear of liability. 47 More simply,
these statutes seek to inspire people without any duty to aid their
fellow citizens to do so anyway. They aim to achieve this goal by
providing immunity to rescuers for any negligent acts or omissions
committed while providing emergency care.48
In providing immunity to rescuers, Good Samaritan statutes
attempt to eliminate the perceived inadequacies of the common
law rule under which a volunteer, assisting an injured person in
good faith with no prior duty to do so, is nevertheless liable for
44. Veilleux, supra note 41, § 2[a]. A common requirement under Good
Samaritan statutes is that the rescuer must have acted in "good faith" without
expectation of any compensation in order to qualify for the statutory
immunity. Id. Another common limitation is that the actions cannot rise to the
level of gross negligence, recklessness, or any other heightened states of
culpability. Id. § 4. Specific language commonly employed in Good Samaritan
statutes such as "emergency," "peril," etc. have often proved difficult for courts
faced with the need to determine the scope of a statute's coverage. Id. § 6. In
Van Horn, the determination of what constituted "emergency care" was the
key to whether or not the defendant was protected by immunity under the
California statute. 197 P.3d at 167. There, the California Supreme Court
looked primarily at the placement of the Good Samaritan statute in the health
and safety code amongst a large number of medical provisions in ultimately
deciding that "emergency care" actually meant "emergency medical care." Id.
With this definition in place, the defendant was ineligible for statutory
immunity because she was an ordinary citizen, and thus had not provided any
form of "medical" care in pulling her friend from the car. Id.
45. Veilleux, supra note 41, § 6. Courts have generally held that Good
Samaritan immunity does not apply to public officials who have a pre-existing
duty to aid others such as policemen and firemen. Id. § 12. This makes sense
because these types of rescuers do not need any inducement to help others,
which the statutes are generally designed to create. Id.
46. Id. §6. For example, Utah's statute applies to "emergencies." UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-11-22(1) (West 2003). Conversely, Idaho's statute uses the
term "accident." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-330 (2003). Understandably, one might
question the difference between these two terms and the ultimate effect they
have on who is and is not granted immunity under the statute. The answer to
that question is beyond the scope of this Comment.
47. Veilleux, supra note 41, § 2.
48. Id. §12.
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failing to exercise "reasonable care" in providing the assistance.49
Because these statutes stand in direct opposition with the
centuries old no-duty rule, they are necessarily driven by public
policy concerns.
Given the wide variety of statutes found nationwide, it is
apparent that state legislatures have crafted their own statutes to
further the policies important to their own constituents.50
III. ANALYSIS
This section will first discuss California's recently enacted
Good Samaritan statute. Illinois's Good Samaritan Act is then
compared and contrasted with its California counterpart to
illustrate its shortcomings.
A.

California'sGood Samaritan Statute

On August 6, 2009, California Governor Arnold
Schwarzenegger approved an amendment to the California Good
Samaritan statute. 5 1 The legislature drafted the amendment in
response to the California Supreme Court's ruling in Van Horn v.
Watson.52 The legislature marked the bill as urgent because the
court's decision in that case had "thrown into question"
California's longstanding policy of encouraging citizens to aid
others in emergency situations without fear of being sued; as a
result, the new law immediately went into effect.5 3
49. Id.; see also Schiff, supra note 36, at 110-14 (noting the various social
and psychological theories behind Good Samaritan laws and their ultimate
effect on citizens). The term "reasonable care" is placed in quotes here due to
its amorphous standard. First year law students quickly learn that what is
deemed "reasonable" in one situation may not be "reasonable" in the next
based on what otherwise appears to be a trivial difference. Sometimes, the end
result is arguably nothing more legally sound or predictable than one court's
take on a particular day. Given this hazy and vague standard, rescuers have
placed themselves in a risky situation by seeking to help others in good faith.
Even noted legal scholars may rightfully disagree after the fact as to whether
the rescuer's conduct was reasonable or not.
50. See, e.g., McDowell v. Gillie, 626 N.W.2d 666, 671-74 (N.D. 2001)
(discussing the policy reasons behind North Dakota's Good Samaritan statute
and looking to several other jurisdictions' statutes). In McDowell, the North
Dakota Supreme Court ultimately chose to interpret its own statute broadly
because it felt this best achieved the legislature's purpose in enacting the law.
Id. Although it discussed cases from other jurisdictions, the court was frank in
noting the problem created as a result of the varied statutory terminology and
policy rationales, finding "[c]ases from other jurisdictions are not particularly
helpful in resolving the issue before us because those decisions are necessarily
dependent upon the terminology of a specific statute." Id. at 672.
51. Posting of Cynthia Lambert to California Civil Justice Blog, Governor
Signs Bills to Protect Good Samaritans,http://www.cjac.org/blog/2009/08/gover
nor-signs-bills-to-protec/.
52. Id.
53. 2009 CAL. LEGIS. SERV. Ch. 77 § 1 (West).
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The statute now makes clear the California Legislature's
desire to provide immunity to all Good Samaritan rescuers, not
just those with some type of medical training or expertise. 54 The
new section states:
No person who in good faith, and not for compensation, renders
emergency medical or nonmedical care at the scene of an emergency
shall be liable for civil damages resulting from any act or omission. 55
Though this statutory language is short and to the point, it
contains numerous important words and phrases.
First, the statute preserves the broad "no person" language; it
does not limit its coverage to any subset of people with specialized
training or expertise.5 6 Second, it maintains language commonly
seen in Good Samaritan statutes that the aid must be rendered in
"good faith" and "not for compensation."5 7 Third, immunity is
58
expressly limited to aid provided at the scene of an emergency.
Fourth, the statute only protects Good Samaritan rescuers from
being sued for ordinary negligence.5 9 Rescuers may be held liable if
their conduct rises to the level of gross negligence or willful or
wanton misconduct.60 Last, the statute effectively employs three
new words, "or nonmedical care," to overturn the California
61
Supreme Court's holding in Van Horn.
Much of the language just discussed in the new statute was
also present in the prior version. 62 The key portion of the old
statute, on which the Van Horn majority focused, was "[n]o person
who .

.

68
. renders emergency care at the scene of an emergency."

The parties had different interpretations of this seemingly
straightforward language. 64 Torti argued that the statute applied
to all emergency care rendered at the scene of an emergency, 65 but
Van Horn argued that its application was limited to emergency
66
medical care rendered at the scene of a medical emergency. The
67
majority ultimately agreed with Van Horn's interpretation.
With this interpretation in mind, we return to the language of
54. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1799.102 (West 2009).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. §1799.102(a).
59. See id. §1799.102(b)(2) (asserting that the actor will not be liable unless
the conduct constitutes willful and wanton misconduct).
60. Id.
61. Id. §1799.102(a).
62. See id. §1799.102(a) (stating "[N]o person who in good faith.
compare with §1799.102 ch. 9, §7 (using the same language quoted above).
63. Van Horn v. Watson, 197 P.3d 164, 167 (Cal. 2008).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 167-71.
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the recently amended Good Samaritan statute and the three
powerful words now present: "or nonmedical care."68 The
legislature unquestionably agreed with Torti's argument that
statutory immunity applies broadly to all types of care rendered at
the scene of an emergency. The California Supreme Court erred in
its conclusion that the legislature only intended to provide
protection for people with some type of medical training.6 9
California's recently amended Good Samaritan statute
accomplishes the legislature's stated goal of encouraging
"individuals to volunteer, without compensation, to assist others in
need during an emergency, while ensuring that those volunteers
who provide care or assistance act responsibly."70 While this goal
may have understandably been questioned after the court's
holding in Van Horn, the legislature moved quickly to reverse the
court's decision and ensure that its goal would not be thwarted.
With this backdrop in mind, we now examine the Illinois Good
Samaritan Act.
B. The Illinois Good [Insert Medical or Other Trained
ProfessionalHere] SamaritanAct
The Illinois Good Samaritan Act ("the Act") is, at best, a
misnomer. At worst, it is a fraud aimed at deceiving members of
the general public who either have no reason to read the actual
text of the Act, or lack the expertise to truly understand who it
does and, more importantly, does not protect. California's Good
Samaritan statute and Illinois's Good Samaritan Act have the
term "Good Samaritan" in common. But Illinois's definition of the
term is a far cry from that of California.7 1
68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE

§

1799.102 (b)(2).

69. The legislature's decision to amend the Good Samaritan statute also
means that Justice Baxter was correct in his dissent when he argued in favor
of the broader interpretation of the law. See Van Horn, 197 P.2d at 172
(Baxter, J. dissenting) (arguing that the majority's interpretation was not in
accordance with the legislature's intent).
70. Id. (quoting §1799.102(b)(1))
71. A quick entry of "Good Samaritan" into Dictionary.com's definition
engine produced similar results: "a person who gratuitously gives help or
sympathy to those in distress (Dictionary.com Unabridged); a compassionate
person who unselfishly helps others (American Heritage Dictionary of the
English Language, 4th ed.); persons who go out of their way to perform acts of
kindness to others, especially strangers (American Heritage New Dictionary of
Cultural Literacy, 4th ed.); one who voluntarily renders aid to another in
distress although under no duty to do so (Merriam Webster's Dictionary of
Law); a compassionate person who unselfishly helps others (American
Heritage Dictionary of Idioms)." DICTIONARY.cOM, http://dictionary.reference.c
om/browse/good+samaritan (last visited Dec. 3, 2010).
These definitions are in line with the coverage of California's Good
Samaritan statute. Nowhere in any of the definitions does the term "medical"
or "professional" appear. This demonstrates why Illinois's Good Samaritan Act
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The Good Samaritan Act is a collection of statutes. 72 Unlike
the single statute providing broad coverage to all persons
employed in California, Illinois has instead adopted a number of
individual statutory sections. 73 As of this writing, there are
twenty-four sections, and each grants immunity to a distinct
category of people.74 All but one section applies to some type of
trained professional.7 5 There are provisions for physicians,76
nurses,77 dentists,78 police officers,79 and EMTs,80 just to name a
few. 8' But notably and inexplicably absent from any of the Good
is not in tune with the real world and what a Good Samaritan means to the
public. The Illinois definition is far too narrow in its scope to be anything
resembling common sense and reality. Recall also the Biblical parable from
which the phrase is derived, and specifically the fact that the Good Samaritan
possessed no medical training or expertise. Supra notes 20-23 and
accompanying text.
72. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. §49/1-49/120 (West 2009).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. The lone section that does not apply to trained professionals covers
choking situations. Id. § 49/65. It provides immunity to "any person who in
good faith removes or attempts to remove food in an emergency occurring at a
food-service establishment as defined in the Choke-Saving Methods Act." Id.
This is the only section that does not require the rescuer to fall within a
specific category of persons.
76. Id. §§ 49/25, 49/42, 49/50. One court provides a recent example of how
the physician provision is interpreted and applied by courts. See Rodas v.
SwedishAmerican Health System Corp., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant physicians because
they were immune from suit for any ordinary negligence under the Good
Samaritan Act). In interpreting the statute, the district court noted the lack of
any decisions on point issued by the Illinois Supreme Court. Id. at 1038. The
court also stated that a flexible standard is employed to determine whether
the aid was rendered in an emergency: "based on the unforeseen, unexpected
combination of circumstances presented which require the need for immediate
action, assistance, or relief." Id. at 1038 (quoting Rivera v. Arana, 749 N.E.2d
434, 442 (Ill.App.Ct. 2001)). One author discusses the concept physicians as
Good Samaritans in Illinois. See generally Theodore R. LeBlang, The
Physicianas Good Samaritan:Evolving Legal Protections Under Illinois Law,
90 ILL. B.J. 522 (2002) (tracing the gradual expansion of protection afforded to
physicians in the emergency rescue context by analyzing a number of statutes
and important cases). Professor LeBlang states that the first physician Good
Samaritan statute in Illinois was passed in 1965. Id. at 522.
77. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. 49/34, 49/35, 49/40 (West 2009).
78. Id. § 49/15.
79. Id. § 49/70.
80. Id.
81. There is even a section which grants immunity to licensed veterinarians
who provide emergency care to humans at the scene of an accident. Id. § 49/60.
But this is by no means the most bizarre of the Act's provisions. Podiatrists, or
foot doctors, are protected for emergency care provided in case of "nuclear
attack." Id. § 49/50. Similarly, respiratory care practitioners are safe in the
event of nuclear attacks as well as hurricanes, earthquakes, and tornados. Id.
§ 49/55. Curiously, the section applicable to physicians makes no mention of
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Samaritan Act's twenty-four separate sections is any protection for
lay persons not trained in a particular field.
The lack of a section providing protection for untrained
citizens becomes even more bewildering upon examination of the
Good Samaritan Act's stated legislative purpose. The first section
of the Act states that the legislature "has established numerous
protections for the generous and compassionate acts of its citizens
who volunteer their time and talents to help others . . . the

provisions of this Act shall be liberally construed to encourage
persons to volunteer their time and talents."82 The legislative
purpose sounds acceptable when viewed in isolation, but the Act
that follows fails to live up to the introduction. Nowhere in the
legislative purpose is there any reference to physicians, EMTs,
nurses, or any other type of trained citizen.83 The purpose
statement simply refers to "citizens" and "persons," categories that
are far broader than the Act actually covers. 84 If the goal of the
Good Samaritan Act truly is to encourage rescuers who voluntarily
come to the aid of others by providing them immunity, then the
Act must protect non-medical rescuers.
But there is a more problematic commonality among all of the
existing statutory categories. Most are in the "business" of helping
those in need in one form or another. An entire legislative Act that
protects people doing what they are trained to do or otherwise
performing the very same tasks they do each and every day as
part of their paid employment is insufficient.
It is true that when involved in off-duty volunteer situations,
these individuals are not being paid, but is it really necessary to
encourage physicians, for example, to come to the rescue of those
in need? Absent the Good Samaritan Act, would an off-duty
physician not choose to help anyway? At least from a moral or
ethical viewpoint we would hope that in such a situation a
physician would be willing to assist even without the Act. 85 Some
may disagree about whether physicians, police officers, and the
Act's other categories of people truly need encouragement in
rescue situations. 86 But the group of people who are most in need
any of these unique events. Id. § 49/25. Upon full examination, the random
categories that make up the Good Samaritan Act appear to be piecemeal and
sometimes arbitrary in who is and is not protected. California's simplistic
approach, which eliminates the need for such a laundry list of categories, is
preferable.
82. Id. § 49/2.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. The American Medical Association's code of ethics agrees. SCHWARTZ,
supra note 33, at 419 n.4. The code states the doctors should render services to
the best of their ability when confronted with emergency situations where help
is needed. Id.
86. In fact, many courts confronted with broad Good Samaritan statutes
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of encouragement and protection in rescue situations are everyday
citizens, who are not involved daily in the business of recue or life
saving.8 7
On a purely theoretical basis, it might be argued that it is for
that very reason that states should not encourage untrained lay
persons to get involved in these dangerous situations.88 But in
actuality, this large segment of the population, who possess no
medical training of any sort, is frequently the only available group
near the scene of an emergency.89 This was certainly the case in
Van Horn, where EMTs did not arrive on the scene until after Van
have held that immunity should not apply to public officials such as these who
have some form of pre-existing duty to aid others. Veilleux, supra note 41,
§ 12. The logic behind this conclusion is that these categories of rescuers need
no inducement to help others. Id.
87. In 2008, ABC Primetime conducted an interesting experiment of Good
Samaritan behavior as part of its "What Would You Do?" series. Thomas
Berman, Are You a Good Samaritan?, ABC NEWS (Mar. 11, 2008),
http://abcnews.go.com/PrimetimefWhatWouldYouDo/Story?id=4420829&page=
1. The network placed ads in the newspaper and online seeking people who
were interested in appearing on television. Id. A group of twenty-two people
was selected to meet with a network producer. Id. During this appointment,
each person was asked to select a topic to discuss on camera by choosing one of
several cards. Id. Unbeknownst to the volunteers, all the cards contained the
topic of the Good Samaritan story from the Bible. Id. They were then told that
they would be required to speak about this topic at a nearby studio. Id. Each
was given precise instructions on how to walk to the studio, which took them
directly through a small park where actors had been placed and instructed to
appear in need of help by moaning and crying. Id. Some were given time
limitations that required them to hurry, while others were not. Id. Even with
the Good Samaritan freshly imprinted on their mind, many in the group did
not stop to help. Id. Only thirty-five percent of those in a hurry stopped; eighty
percent of those not in a hurry stopped. Id. Also, there were two actors, one
black and one white. Id. The white actor was three times more likely than the
black actor to receive help. Id. This experiment paints a sad picture of the
effects of race and pressure on people's willingness to come to the aid of others
as a Good Samaritan.
88. See Sebok, supra note 16 (articulating this argument and stating that
in emergency situations nonmedical rescuers should actually be discouraged
from involvement because the situations are "over their head").
89. Heroic stories of Good Samaritans coming to the rescue of those in need
are commonplace. E.g., Bystander Saves Boy From Burning Building, ABC
NEWS VIDEO (Sept. 30, 2009), http://abcnews.go.com/video/playerIndex?id=871
7040; Stranger Saves Dog Attack Victim, ABC NEWS VIDEO (Feb. 3, 2009),
Vikki Ortiz, Good
http://abcnews.go.comlvideo/playerlndex?id=6796422;
Samaritan in rescue saw car lights glowing in pond, CHICAGO BREAKING
NEWS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.chicagobreakingnews.com/2009/10/car-drivesinto-pond-in-wheaton.html; Boy Scouts Rescued From Grand Canyon, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 19, 2008), http://i.abcnews.com/US/Weather/story?id=5606937&p
age=1; Mike Celizic, Good Samaritan felt mother's 'pain and panic,
TODAYSHOW.COM (Aug. 27, 2007), http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/20462424/.
These stories indicate the need for Good Samaritan laws to protect good faith
rescuers who courageously put their life on the line to help their fellow citizens
and should not face lawsuits as a result of their bravery.
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Horn had already been pulled from the wreckage.90 Recall that one
of the co-authors of the California amendment was a former
highway patrolman of more than twenty years.9 1 He candidly
acknowledged that he frequently arrived at emergency scenes to
find citizens already assisting; it was his corresponding fear that
such non-medical rescuers who aided in good faith may be liable to
suit that led him to act quickly in amending the statute. 92
The Illinois General Assembly apparently sees no reason to
provide immunity for non-medical rescuers who voluntarily come
to the aid of their fellow citizens. If it did, another section could
easily be added to the Good Samaritan Act. As recently as 2006,
the General Assembly added a provision to the Act covering first
aid providers.93 The author of that bill stated that "people who are
certified in first aid should be able to act without reservation in an
emergency situation, and the law the Governor signed today will
make that possible." 94
The implied corollary is that people without first aid or other
training should act with reservation in the very same emergency
situation.9 5 In failing to provide coverage for non-medical rescuers,
the legislature has effectively decided on behalf of all Illinois
citizens that those in need of rescue do not want untrained people
aiding them. 96
90. Van Horn, 197 P.3d at 166.
91. Stateman, supra note 14; see also supra note 17 (detailing
Representative Benoit's initial reaction to the California Supreme Court's
ruling in Van Horn).
92. Stateman, supra note 14.
93. Press Release, Governor's Office, Governor Blagojevich signs new laws
to protect "Good Samaritans" who help injured people, Illinois Government
News Network, Governor's Office Press Release (June 2, 2006),
http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ShowPressRelease.cfm?SubjectlD=3&Re
cNum=4949.
94. Id.
95. Of course, it is highly unlikely that any member of the Illinois General
Assembly would ever make such a candid admission, but the text of the Good
Samaritan Act makes this conclusion inescapable.
96. Perhaps this decision is evidence of our society's obsession with
autonomy and accomplishing everything on our own, without the need for
anyone else's help. But as Professor Gregory pointed out, even while
acknowledging this questionable obsession we should still create laws to
protect those who do admirably choose to help others of their own volition:
I suppose there is much to be said for the old Anglo-American attitude of
minding your own business-except that as the world changes, other
peoples' business in more and more ways becomes yours. But I do not
see how we can legislate charity, altruism, and courage-both physical
and moral. Some things we can do. We can widen the area of immunity
of rescuers from tort liability-and even criminal liability. We may even
compensate them for harm they incur themselves.
Charles 0. Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American
Law, in THE GOOD SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 38-39, (James M. Ratcliffe, ed.,
Doubleday & Company 1981).
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C. Analyzing Van Horn v. Watson under the Illinois Good
SamaritanAct
To bring this analysis full circle we return briefly to the Van
Horn case. 7 The public was unhappy with the California Supreme
Court's ruling, which employed a questionable and narrow
98
interpretation of the state's Good Samaritan statute. Result:
99
good faith rescuers may be held liable.
Now move this entire story to Illinois. Had the same case
reached the Illinois Supreme Court, it would undoubtedly reach
the same result without the need for any narrow or questionable
interpretation of Illinois law.10 0 The Illinois Good Samaritan Act is
exceedingly clear in providing no protection whatsoever for nonmedical rescuers such as Torti. Consequently, the Illinois Good
Samaritan Act fails to live up to its name.101
97. See supra notes 14-16 (detailing the negative reactions from citizens in
California and the rest of the country to the California Supreme Court's ruling
in the case).
98. Id.; Van Horn, 197 P.3d at 171.
99. Van Horn, 197 P.3d at 171. In other words, Torti was not entitled to the
statutory grant of immunity. The result in the case stands in sharp contrast
with the story of Mark Barnard, Michael David Landry, and Andrew Douglas
Hilderman, three recipients of the 2009 Carnegie Medal for Extraordinary
Heroism. Carnegie Hero Fund Commission: Latest Carnegie Medal Awardees,
CARNEGIE
HERO
FUND
COMMISSION,
(Sept.
29,
2009),
http://www.carnegiehero.org/awardeesrecent.php. (click "September 29" in
"2009" row for PDF). The three young Canadians were passing motorists who
came upon the scene of a car accident by chance one evening. Id. A twenty-five
year old woman had just lost control of her vehicle and driven off the highway
and down an embankment. Id. The men worked together to cut the woman's
seat belt and pulled her to safety away from the flames which had begun to
engulf the car. Id.
Like Torti, none of the men were medical professionals or possessed any
expertise in rescue situations: a carpenter, an electrician, and a landscape
manager. Id. They were ordinary people who acted courageously to aid a
fellow citizen in an emergency situation. Id. Yet they received a prestigious
award for heroism and Torti is left to defend a lawsuit filed by her former
friend. Fair? Certainly not in the eyes of Andrew Carnegie, the famed
Pittsburgh steelmaker who set up the Carnegie Foundation in 1904 to honor
civilian heroes and to provide financial assistance when these heroes are
injured or killed as a result of their bravery. The History of the CarnegieHero
Fund, CARNEGIE HERO FUND COMMISSION, http://www.carnegiehero.org/fund
history (last visited Dec. 3, 2010). The Fund has awarded more than nine
thousand medals and thirty million dollars in accompanying grants since its
inception. Id.
100. For this reason it is highly unlikely that such a case will ever reach the
Illinois Supreme Court under the existing state of the law. A good faith
rescuer with no training or expertise would simply be unable to point to any
section of the Act that comes anywhere close to providing immunity.
101. It bears repeating that this conclusion is based on the fact that the
Bible's Good Samaritan possessed no medical training or expertise. LUKE,
supra note 20. Thus, the Good Samaritan Act does not protect Good
Samaritans in the original meaning of the term.
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IV. PROPOSAL
For the Illinois Good Samaritan Act to be accurately titled, it
must live up to its namesake and provide immunity to non-medical
rescuers. The Illinois General Assembly should draft a new statute
that provides broad protection for mere negligence to all rescuers
who volunteer in good faith.
Protecting any person who comes to the aid of another in an
emergency situation will bring the Good Samaritan Act more
closely in line with its stated purpose of encouraging the "generous
and compassionate acts" of citizens who courageously seek to help
others in emergencies. 102 At present, the Act more accurately
encourages such action only by the limited groups of people
expressly named in the various provisions. Additionally, the
legislature should take the initiative to establish a restorative
compensation fund for rescuers who are injured or killed as a
result of their courageous actions.
A. Draftinga New Good Samaritan Statute
Drafting and implementing a new Good Samaritan law would
be relatively simple and straightforward, as demonstrated by
California's swift and effective action. The California Legislature
has provided a recent blueprint which can be copied in whole or in
part. But California is by no means the only state which has a
statute providing broad protection. For example, Minnesota and
Wisconsin have similar statutes. 103 Between these three statutes

102. 745 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 49/2 (West 2009).
103. The Wisconsin statute provides:
Any person who renders emergency care at the scene of any emergency
or accident in good faith shall be immune from civil liability for his or
her acts or omissions in rendering such emergency care. This immunity
does not extend when employees trained in health care or health care
professionals render emergency care for compensation and within the
scope of their usual and customary employment or practice at a hospital
or other institution equipped with hospital facilities, at the scene of any
emergency or accident, en route to a hospital or other institution
equipped with hospital facilities or at a physician's office.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.48(1) (West 2010). The Wisconsin Supreme Court most
recently discussed the statute in 2006. Mueller v. McMillian Warner Ins. Co.,
714 N.W.2d 183, 186 (Wis. 2006). Interestingly, Wisconsin's original Good
Samaritan statute, which was passed in 1963, provided immunity only to
medical professionals who rendered emergency care. Barry W. Szymanski, The
Good Samaritan Statute: Civil Liability Exemptions for Emergency Care, 80JUL WIs. LAWYER 10, 13 (2007). However, the state chose to extend the
statutory protection to laypersons in 1977. Id. Over thirty years later, Illinois
has yet to catch up with its northern neighbor. The Minnesota statute is
similar:
A person who, without compensation or the expectation of
compensation, renders emergency care, advice, or assistance at the
scene of an emergency or during transit to a location where professional
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there is ample room for the Illinois General Assembly to pick and
choose as it sees fit in drafting its own piece of legislation.
Additionally, providing broad protection will bring muchneeded simplicity to the Good Samaritan Act's current list of
twenty-four provisions which each address a different category of
people. The implementation of a new statute will necessarily
eliminate the need for many of the current sections by subsuming
their coverage. Thus, the end result will not only be simpler for
citizens to understand, but it will also be easier for courts and
lawyers to analyze without the need to examine multiple
provisions currently totaling almost nine pages of text. Instead,
Illinois courts will be able to focus on the new statute in cases
other than those involving exceptional circumstances not covered
under the provision's broad protection. In turn, this will better
enable courts to develop uniform principles in interpreting the new
statute, which can then be referred to by future courts faced with
similar issues.
Drafting a new, broader Good Samaritan statute is a crucial
step in furthering the legislature's desirable policy of encouraging
people to come to the aid of their fellow citizens in emergency
situations. It provides protection for those who would choose to
help regardless of this encouragement.10 4 But, implementing a new
medical care can be rendered, is not liable for any civil damages as a
result of acts or omissions by that person in rendering the emergency
care, advice, or assistance, unless the person acts in a willful and
wanton or reckless manner in providing the care, advice, or assistance.
This subdivision does not apply to a person rendering emergency care,
advice, or assistance during the course of regular employment, and
receiving compensation or expecting to receive compensation for
rendering the care, advice, or assistance.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(2) (West 2010). The Minnesota statute is likely
broader in the protection it provides because it covers the typical "care" as well
as "advice or assistance" rendered at the scene of an emergency. Id. The
statute was examined in detail in Swenson v. Waseca Mut. Ins. Co., 653
N.W.2d 794, 796-800 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002).
Also recall that Wisconsin and Minnesota are two of the states that
have chosen to impose limited duties on citizens in certain situations. WIs.
STAT. ANN. § 940.34 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604A.01(1) (West 2010);
see also supra note 36 (noting the five states which have imposed similar
duties and the typical penalty for violation of the statutes).
104. Although an enormous amount of scholarly debate has historically
focused on the theoretical pros and cons of imposing a duty to rescue, recent
empirical research suggests that this focus may be misplaced. David Hyman,
Rescue Without Law: An Empirical Perspective on the Duty to Rescue, 84 TEX.
L. REV. 653, 656-57 (2006). Professor Hyman conducted the first empirical
study assessing the realities of the no-duty rule in society. Id. This stands in
stark contrast with the amount of literature on the no-duty rule: every major
treatise and textbook on torts contains a section on the topic, and over 100 law
review articles have been written about the subject. Id. at 661-64. The
ultimate conclusion of Professor Hyman's study was that despite the lack of a
legal duty, morality invariably wins out in rescue situations: "rescue is the
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statute need not be the end of the remedial progression.
Additionally, the Illinois General Assembly should establish a
fund to compensate good faith rescuers who are injured while
aiding others.
B. Establishinga CompensationFund for Good Samaritan
Rescuers
Approximately seventy-eight Americans are killed every year
as a result of their heroic actions when attempting to rescue
someone else.105 There is a lack of financial protection for these
and other good faith rescuers who are injured in performing their
courageous acts.106 In these situations immunity from suit is
certainly helpful, but as a society we should do more than merely
provide legal shelter. There is often a need for funds to compensate
good faith rescuers and their families who face financial burdens
as a result of their actions.10 7
All fifty states provide some type of financial assistance for
crime victims.108 Some states, such as Illinois, even extend
eligibility for these funds to rescuers injured in seeking to protect
victims of criminal acts. 0 9 Unfortunately, this concept has
rule-even if it is not the law." Id. at 657. Thus, while the policy of
encouraging rescue remains desirable even if minimal in its real-world effect,
the high number of attempted rescues still suggests the strong need for
protection of good faith rescuers.
105. Id. at 668.
106. Norval Morris, Compensation and the Good Samaritan, in THE GOOD
SAMARITAN AND THE LAW 138-39, (James M. Ratcliffe, ed., Doubleday &
Company 1981). Professor Morris stated:
It is so easy to talk about the failure of others; of how Good
Samaritanship seems to be a dying art among others. There is another
parable, something about a mote and an eye, which seems to me to have
some relevance. Perhaps we should first talk about ourselves, and our
failure to provide even minimum conditions financially to protect those
amongst us who are willing to act the Good Samaritan.
Id. The results presented in this Comment suggest that this problem is a
serious one, deserving of immediate attention. Id. This issue may lack the
glamour of taking yet another run at reversing the no-duty rule, but it is a
much more serious problem than the one that has preoccupied scholars who
have written on the subject of the duty to rescue for the past two centuries. Id.
107. Id.
108. National Association of Crime Victim Compensation Boards Fact Sheet,
http://nacvcb.org (follow the "Click here basic information on Crime Victim
Compensation" hyperlink). These programs are administered separately by
each state and assist approximately 200,000 victims and their families every
year, paying out close to $450 million annually. Id. Each state determines who
is eligible, and what is eligible for reimbursement. Id. "The vast majority of
the money to fund these programs comes from offender fees and fines, rather
than taxpayer dollars, with about a third coming from the federal [Victims of
Crime Act of 1984]." Id.; 42 U.S.C. 10601 (2010).
109. Crime Victims Compensation Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/1-45/20
(West 2010). Under the Act, eligible victims of violent crimes can apply to
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frequently been ignored by state legislatures and commentators
outside of the criminal setting.11 0 Not surprisingly, one noteworthy
exception is California, which extends its victim compensation
fund to Good Samaritans injured or killed in emergencies, not
merely criminal situations."
The concept of creating a fund to assist injured Good
Samaritans and their families and loved ones makes perfect sense.
California has again provided a worthy model in this context.112
Funding could be pooled from a number of resources such as civil
fines, criminal fines, portions of punitive damage awards, or from
a specially created portion of the state's budget. Alternatively,
Illinois's current victim compensation fund could simply be
extended to also compensate Good Samaritans, as California has
chosen to do. The detailed financial nuances are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
The concept is addressed here in hopes that the topic will
receive deserved attention and discussion not only from the Illinois
General Assembly, but also from other states nationwide. The
ultimate goal should be to bring the state of the law in this area
receive up to $27,000 for various unreimbursed expenses such as medical and
hospital care, dental care, mental health counseling, lost earnings,
replacement costs, and funeral or burial expenses. Crime Victim
Compensation: Frequently Asked Questions, ILLINOIS ATTORNEY GENERAL
WEBSITE, 1, http://www.ag.state.il.us/victims/CVFAQ_0908.pdf. The term
"victim" under the Act includes "a person who is killed or injured while
attempting to assist a crime victim." Id.; 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 45/2(d)(3)
(West 2010). As a result, Good Samaritan rescuers who voluntarily come to
the aid of crime victims are eligible for the Act's compensation.
110. This concept has not been overlooked outside of the legal sphere,
however. See discussion supra note 100 (referring to the Carnegie
Foundation's annual award of medals and accompanying grants for heroic
rescuers who are injured or killed while risking their lives to help others).
111. The California Victim Compensation and Government Claims Board
administers the state's more traditional Victims Compensation Program as
well as the novel Good Samaritan Program. Victim Compensation and
Government
Claims Board, STATE
OF
CALIFORNIA
WEBSITE,
http://www.boc.ca.gov/about.aspx (last updated 2007). The Good Samaritan
Program exists "[flor the courageous person who selflessly responds to the
needs of others" in challenging and unexpected situations. Good Samaritan
Program,CALIFORNIA VICTIM COMPENSATION & GOVERNMENT CLAIMS BOARD,
http://www.boc.ca.gov/docs/brochures/GoodSamaritanProgram.pdf.
Private citizens who have voluntarily come to the rescue of someone in
"immediate danger of injury or death as presented by a crime, a civil or
natural disaster or catastrophe, or other incident such as an auto accident or
drowning" are eligible to receive up to $10,000 in compensation for their
resulting unreimbursed expenses. Id. The expenses covered include medical
treatment, mental health treatment, lost wages, funeral and burial, and
property loss. Id. The Good Samaritan simply must fill out an application,
along with a corroborating statement from a public safety or law enforcement
agency. Id.
112. Id.
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more closely in line with basic notions of morality and fairness
which are inextricably connected to the term Good Samaritan. The
legal system should not turn a blind eye to these foundational nonlegal concepts which undeniably underlie this area of the law.113
C. PotentialRamifications
If the Illinois General Assembly does not take action, it will
soon find itself in the same unenviable position as its Californian
counterpart. Now is a perfect opportunity to be proactive in
making a change, rather than waiting to be forced to react to court
action. If the legislature stubbornly chooses to stand fast it will
almost certainly face heightened criticism and scrutiny when the
public discovers the Good Samaritan Act's current lack of
protection for citizens with no specialized training or expertise.
V.

CONCLUSION

The recent case of Van Horn v. Watson has brought muchneeded attention to the Good Samaritan topic nationwide. The
California Supreme Court's analysis and conclusion was contrary
to the most basic sense of morality and justice, thereby
necessitating the need for expedient change. Fortunately, the
citizens of California expressed their unhappiness and the
Legislature moved quickly to remedy the problem. Unfortunately,
the same potential problem currently exists in Illinois.
Illinois should take this opportunity to follow the lead of
California and other states that currently provide broad protection
to good faith rescuers under their Good Samaritan statutes. A new
law providing broader protection to anyone who comes to the aid of
their fellow citizen in an emergency situation would more
accurately reflect the Good Samaritan Act's current stated purpose
while also preserving the common law's historical adherence to
individualistic autonomy evidenced by the no-duty rule. Finally,
Illinois should either extend the state's victim compensation
program to cover Good Samaritan rescuers who are injured or
killed as a result of their courageous acts, or establish a new fund
to achieve the same purpose.

113. In choosing to provide encouragement and assistance to Good
Samaritans rather than continuing to ignore their plight, the law's approach
will mirror that of the Good Samaritan. As Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. said,
"[Tlhe first question which the priest and the Levite asked was, "[i]f I stop to
help this man, what will happen to me?" But ... the Good Samaritan reversed
the question: "[ilf I do not stop to help this man, what will happen to him?" I've
Been to the Mountaintop, Speech at the Mason Temple (Church of God in
Christ Headquarters), Memphis, Tennessee (April 3, 1968). Video and
transcript availableat http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/mlkivebeent
othemountaintop.htm.

